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Abstract
The efficacy of bundling is well-known in the context of
digital goods with zero marginal cost. However, digital
goods are also prone to piracy, and it is not clear what
impact piracy might have on the efficacy of bundling.
Prior research on this issue is limited, and it suggests
that the appeal of bundling remains intact in the face of
piracy. Using a model that recasts the classic bundling
problem in the backdrop of piracy, we question this
insight and show that piracy can severely diminish the
appeal of bundling. In fact, bundling exacerbates the
piracy problem and pushes more consumers to substitute
the legal products with illegal ones, which more than off-
sets the usual benefits of bundling to a monopolist seller.
Overall, the manufacturers of digital goods need to take
piracy into consideration in their bundling decision and,
perhaps, refrain from bundling when they anticipate the
threat of piracy to be severe.
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1. Introduction
Information goods are often sold in bundles. For
example, each music album is essentially a bundle of
songs, and each software suite, one of multiple appli-
cations. As pointed out by Shapiro and Varian [23],
bundling enables the manufacturer to extract more
surplus from consumers “when it reduces the disper-
sion in their willingness to pay.” In addition, what
makes bundling particularly relevant to the case of
information goods is their cost structure—as shown
by Bakos and Brynjolfsson [6], the relative benefit of
bundling vis-à-vis separate selling decreases with the
marginal cost. Since information goods can be repro-
duced at a zero marginal cost, their manufacturers
are expected to benefit the most from bundling.
However, aside from being zero-marginal-cost
goods, information products exhibit other unique
characteristics as well, and some—such as their
piracy-prone nature—are highly relevant to the pric-
ing strategy of their manufacturers. As a matter of
fact, even today, piracy continues to plague vari-
ous information-goods markets. A recent report by
the International Federation of Phonographic Indus-
try [14] estimates that a whopping 38% of consumers
consume music illegally. Likewise, the Business Soft-
ware Alliance [7] estimates that 39% of software
installations are not properly licensed. In light of
these facts, it is only natural that we revisit the pre-
scription that bundling is preferable for information
goods, and ask ourselves to what extent it remains
applicable when the issue of piracy is accounted
for. Does piracy increase or decrease the appeal of
bundling? And, if indeed so, why and when?
These questions are in fact of practical signifi-
cance. For example, Agarwal [2] writes, “To com-
bat this piracy, Microsoft sells stand-alone pro-
grams like Word, PowerPoint for a lower price than
the entire [Microsoft Office] suite.” In a similar
vein, Feldman [12] blames bundling of digital con-
tents for increased piracy, and grumbles, “You know
what’s free? Illegally downloaded movies. Piracy
is back. For years, consumers griped about cable
bundling—having to pay high prices for hundreds
of channels that they never watched in order to get
the handful they did watch. The unrealized dream
was that at some point cable companies would relent
and offer à la carte pricing, in which customers only
paid for the channels they wanted. It appears now
that the streaming market saturation has led to a
refracted version of this problem, show bundling.
Fans don’t want all of a streaming service—they only
want certain shows on it.” Feldman goes on to add,
“So you could pay for a dozen different services to
try and consume every new series and album and
movie you’re interested in legally. . . Or you could
just pirate it.” We seek to find out if there is any
truth to such arguments by examining the interac-
tion of piracy with bundling using a rigorous game-
theoretic model.
To address our research questions, we revisit
the classical bundling problem [1]. Specifically, we
reexamine the conditions under which a monopo-
list selling two zero-marginal-cost goods would find
bundling preferable to selling them separately. To





clearly delineate the effect of piracy, we first con-
sider the scenario in which there is no piracy. In this
benchmark model, bundling predictably turns out to
be the dominant strategy across the entire param-
eter space, echoing the result in prior research that
bundling is in general preferable in the case of zero-
marginal-cost goods [6].
The story changes quickly, however, when we
incorporate piracy in this classical bundling prob-
lem. We do so by borrowing from prior research on
piracy, where the pirated version of a product is
modeled as an imperfect substitute for the original,
and the level of anti-piracy enforcement determines
the expected piracy cost faced by a consumer [e.g.,
5, 9, 21]. The resulting setup, which incorporates
both bundling and piracy, is novel to the best of
our knowledge, and it does lead us to some interest-
ing insights. First, it reveals that bundling actually
exacerbates piracy, and the portion of the parameter
space where piracy occurs in the equilibrium con-
siderably expands. In other words, the prevalence of
piracy, to an extent, is attributable to the popular-
ity of bundling in information-goods markets, just
as claimed in the online media [2, 12].
Second, even though bundling makes piracy more
attractive, the converse is certainly not true—piracy,
in fact, makes bundling less attractive. As the man-
ufacturer tries to raise the bundle price, piracy also
increases in lockstep, seeking to erase the gains from
bundling. In fact, we identify two distinct possibil-
ities in equilibrium, one in which the benefits of
bundling are strong enough to outweigh the losses
from increased piracy, and another in which exactly
the opposite is true. In subsequent sections, we elab-
orate on when the first case prevails, as well as
when the other one does. In general, when piracy is
more potent, for example, when the pirated product
is a close substitute for the legal one, bundling is
unlikely to be the dominant strategy. As the quality
gap between the legal and pirated product increases,
so does the appeal of bundling. These findings are
instructive, as they have serious implications for any
manufacturer considering bundling as a part of its
pricing strategy.
2. Literature
The problem of bundling has been extensively stud-
ied in economics [1, 3, 6]. The main finding in
this literature is that bundling decreases valua-
tion heterogeneity among consumers, which trans-
lates to a relatively less elastic demand curve
and a greater pricing power for the manufacturer.
Recently, researchers have studied the applicability
of this insight to novel contexts involving informa-
tion goods. For example, using theoretical models,
they have explored whether it holds in the presence
of network effects [22]. Interestingly, it does not, and
separate selling can indeed become more attractive
vis-à-vis bundling. We too find a similar result in
this work, albeit in a very different context involving
piracy.
Moving on to the literature on piracy, it too
is extensive and spans economics, marketing, and
information systems. Specifically, there has been a
lot of research on how a manufacturer might respond
to piracy strategically, and researchers have inves-
tigated approaches such as nonlinear pricing [24],
strategic patching [4], product sampling [8], strategic
content delivery [16], and versioning [27]. We aug-
ment this line of research by examining the interplay
of bundling with piracy.
Although the literature on piracy and bundling
are both vast, there only exists limited research
at their intersection. Gopal and Gupta [13] exam-
ine how a manufacturer can use bundling to com-
bat what is known as a sharing club. The authors
assume that either all products are pirated or none
is, whereas, in our model, each user decides how
many products to pirate and which ones to pirate. As
a result, not only is our model different, but so also
are our insights. For example, when the valuations
and piracy costs are symmetric across products, we
find that bundling can actually be dominated, a
result that is in clear contrast with findings in [13].
Recently, researchers have considered the problem
of bundling a software product with a cloud-based
service [28, 29]. These papers are considerably differ-
ent from ours in terms of their research setup, and
their insights are not comparable to ours. First, the
cloud-based service happens to have a marginal cost,
which becomes a significant factor in the bundling
decision. Further, and more importantly, the cloud-
based service cannot be pirated; it is only the soft-
ware product that is prone to piracy. We place
no such restrictions. Zhang et al. [29, Observation
5] claim that a low marginal cost favors bundling
despite piracy, which is consistent with findings in
prior literature [6]. In contrast, despite considering
only zero-marginal-cost goods, we find that bundling
can actually be suboptimal.
3. Benchmark Case: No Piracy
Let us consider the pricing problem of a monopolist
that produces and sells two information goods. The
question is whether the firm should sell the two prod-
ucts separately or sell them as a bundle, in a setting
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where each consumer strategically decides whether
to use the authentic product, the pirated version, or
simply neither.
We wish to first set the benchmark by investigat-
ing what happens in the absence of piracy. Then, we
will bring piracy into the mix and investigate how
piracy alters, if it does at all, the appeal of bundling.
Both the benchmark case as well as the full setup
with piracy make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Consumers’ valuation for prod-
uct i ∈ {1,2}, denoted vi, is uniformly distributed
over [0,1]. Further, a consumer’s valuations for the
two products are independent of each other.
The uniform assumption is not critical to our find-
ings; we simply make it to keep the model as parsi-
monious as possible. Regarding the assumption that
a consumer’s valuations for the two products are
independent of each other, it is fairly common in the
bundling literature [6].
As far as the costs are concerned, we make the
following standard assumption [17]:
Assumption 2. The marginal cost is zero for
both products, and the product development costs
(fixed costs) are sunk.
When there is no piracy, each consumer must
choose between buying and forgoing use. If the firm
sells the two products separately, it charges the
monopoly price of 1
2







. On the other hand, if it sells the two
products as a bundle at price p, consumers would
compare v1 + v2 with p to make their decisions.
The distribution for v1 + v2, therefore, determines
the optimal bundle price. Accordingly, we derive the




. This leads to the
following benchmark.
Proposition 1. When there is no piracy in the
market, bundling is the optimal strategy.
This proposition echoes the main finding in [6] that,
absent a marginal cost, bundling tends to outper-
form individual selling. This intuition behind the
result in Proposition 1 is as follows. In the absence
of bundling, the demand is determined by v1 and v2,
each of which follows an uniform distribution. How-
ever, with bundling, the distribution of interest is
that of v1 + v2, which happens to be triangular and
more concentrated around the mean. This concen-
tration manifests itself in the form of a lower demand
elasticity and a higher pricing power for the monop-
olist, making bundling the preferred strategy.
4. Model with Piracy
We now incorporate piracy in the analysis to see
how it impacts the result in Proposition 1. To do
this rigorously, we borrow from prior literature, and
model the pirated product as an imperfect substi-
tute for the legal one [e.g., 4, 11, 25, 24]. There are
several sources of this imperfection. First, pirated
video games and software usually do not get product
support from the manufacturer [18]. Second, pirated
copies can contain embedded malicious codes [15].
Third, examples abound where the physical qual-
ity of the pirated product is less than that of the
original product [19]. For instance, in the case of
pirated movies, pirate sites often do not have access
to fast content delivery networks [16] and intention-
ally “focus on low-resolution streaming through web
sites” [26]. Finally, even when there is little percepti-
ble difference in the physical quality between pirated
and legal versions, illegally procured music or video
files could be missing appropriate tags (artist, title,
and genre, to name a few); the absence of tags and
related indexes can make it difficult to organize and
locate these files within a media player.
Assumption 3. A consumer’s valuation for the
pirated product is δ times his valuation for the
legal one, where δ ∈ (0,1) is the quality degradation
parameter.
Following prior research [4, 21], we also assume
that piracy is costly to consumers and its expected
value reflects the level of anti-piracy enforcement:
Assumption 4. The expected piracy cost per
product is r≥ 0.
Following August and Tunca [4], one can view r
as the expected legal liability—the probability that
an illegal user is successfully prosecuted times the
penalty assessed on detection. In other words, r
depends heavily on the legal context consumers are
situated in. For example, although some developing
nations do not strictly enforce intellectual property
laws, hundreds of piracy-related criminal prosecu-
tions take place in the US every year under the US
Federal Copyright Act (US Code Title 17), implying
that r could be quite significant in the US. Also, sim-
ilar to the US Copyright Act, Assumption 4 treats
each act of piracy as a separate infringement punish-
able by a separate penalty, implying that the total
piracy cost is simply proportional to the number of
products pirated. This is consistent with the asser-
tion in prior literature that the piracy cost “increases
monotonically with. . . the number of products in a
product bundle” [13, p.1949]. In fact, the US Federal
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Copyright Act allows a maximum of $150,000 per
infringement as statutory damages, irrespective of
the actual overall damage to the seller, and accord-
ingly, when the Recording Industry Association of
America brought hundreds of lawsuits to curb illegal
sharing of music, defendants in each faced “penalties
of up to $150,000 per song” [20].
4.1. Selling Separately in the Presence
of Piracy
If the firm charges a price pi for product i, a con-
sumer will purchase the legal version if and only if his
valuation vi satisfies the following individual ratio-
nality and incentive compatibility constraints.
vi− pi ≥ 0 and vi− pi ≥ δvi− r.
The first condition ensures that purchasing is prefer-
able to not using, and the second guarantees that
purchasing is preferable to pirating. The resulting











Proposition 2. When products are sold sepa-

















According to Proposition 2, if the products are sold
separately, the profit from each is p∗i qi(p
∗
i ). There-
fore, only when bundling can generate a revenue
higher than 2p∗i qi(p
∗
i ), would the manufacturer pre-
fer bundling. The intuition behind Proposition 2
happens to be interesting. When r is extremely
small, that is, anti-piracy enforcement is lacking, our
monopolist tolerates piracy and sets a price of 1−δ+r
2
.
If r is somewhat higher but not very high, the firm
sets a price of r
δ
and barely holds off the pirated
product; even though there is no piracy any longer,
the price, r
δ
, depends directly on r. This is because
the threat of piracy remains in effect, and any price
higher than r
δ
allows piracy to resurface [21]. Finally,
when r is so high that piracy becomes completely
moot, the manufacturer regains its full pricing power
and switches to the usual monopoly price of 1
2
.
4.2. Bundling in the Presence of Piracy
We now consider the case in which products are
sold in a bundle. Given a bundle price p, a con-
sumer will purchase the bundle only if his individ-
ual rationality constraint is satisfied, that is, v1 +
v2−p≥ 0. Moving on to incentive compatibility, the
expected surplus from pirating product i is (δvi −
r). However, a consumer pirates a product only if
this surplus is positive. In other words, the con-
sumer may pirate either or both products, or pirate
none. This is logical. For example, in the case of
music, the consumer can just steal the song he is
really interested in, and there is no obligation for
him to take part in illegal sharing of other songs in
the same album. Also, to steal Microsoft Word, the
consumer does not have to install Microsoft Excel
even though they are both a part of the same Office
Suite—the consumer can simply download Microsoft
Word and illegally procure a product key to acti-
vate it. So, our model is consistent with the realities
of most practical situations. Of course, in special
cases, such as that of sharing clubs [13], consumers
may pirate all bundle constituents or pirate none.
It is trivial to show that if we were to impose the
same restriction—anyone pirating must pirate both
products—our model would lead to results consis-
tent with prior research that deems bundling opti-
mal across the board. However, as we will shortly
see, absent any such restriction, the dominance of
bundling unexpectedly falls apart.
Since our consumer chooses whether to pirate and
what to pirate, the maximum surplus he can obtain
from strategically pirating is simply (δv1 − r)+ +
(δv2− r)+, where x+ = max{x,0}. Therefore, a con-
sumer buys the bundle if and only if his valuations,
(v1, v2), satisfy the following:
v1 + v2− p≥ (δv1− r)+ + (δv2− r)+. (1)
This condition is extremely complex and can lead
to different scenarios. To compute the demand, we
must first recognize that the condition in (1) results
in four consumer segments:
Segment 1 (Consumers who do not consider
piracy). Consider consumers satisfying v1 ≤ rδ and
v2 ≤ rδ . They would buy the bundle if and only if
v1 + v2 ≥ p.
Segment 2 (Consumers who might pirate







would buy the bundle if and






Segment 3 (Consumers who never pirate
product 1 but might pirate product 2). Con-




the bundle if and only if v1 + (1− δ)v2 ≥ p− r.
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Segment 4 (Consumers who never pirate
product 2 but might pirate product 1). Finally,
consider consumers with v1 >
r
δ
and v2 ≤ rδ . They
would purchase the authentic bundle if and only if
(1− δ)v1 + v2 ≥ p− r.
Now, when r ≥ δ, it is obvious that the expected
utility from pirating either product is at most zero.
Therefore, the legal demand is simply the number of
consumers for whom v1 + v2 ≥ p. This case is simi-
lar to the one considered in Proposition 1. In other
words, the issue of piracy is relevant only when r < δ.
Not only that, when r < δ, several cases emerge as
well. For each case, one has to consider each of the
four segments above and then aggregate the demand
from each. These cases are listed in (2).
To understand (2) clearly, we need to examine
each of its cases and sub-cases separately. Since
space constraints limit us from comprehensively
examining them all, as an illustration, in Figure 1,
we discuss only one: the sub-case 2r
δ
< p ≤ 1− δ +
r+ r
δ
of Case (ii), δ(1−δ)
2−δ ≤ r < δ. In the figure, con-
sumers located in either of the three colored regions
buy the bundle. The red region (S2) represents the
demand from Segment 2, the blue one (S3) from Seg-
ment 3, and the green (S4) from Segment 4. Recall
that Segment 1 refers to consumers who do not con-
sider piracy at all, Segment 2 is made up of those
who consider pirating either or both, and Segments
3 and 4 comprise the ones who would consider pirat-
ing one product but not the other. In Figure 1, there
is no S1, since there is no demand from Segment 1 in
the sub-case being illustrated. The reason is that it is
impossible to satisfy v1 ≤ rδ , v2 ≤
r
δ
, and v1 + v2 > p
simultaneously when p > 2r
δ
, a condition that must
hold in this particular sub-case. In other words, only





) in Figure 1, Segment 1 could have contributed
to the bundle demand. In more general terms, for
any sub-case of (2), which segments eventually con-
tribute to the bundle demand would depend on the
relative sizes of of p, r, and δ for that sub-case.
To elaborate on the geometry further, the condi-
tions p > 2r
δ
and δ(1−δ)
2−δ ≤ r—both necessary in this
sub-case—together imply that p > 1− δ + r, ensur-
ing that the point (1, p − (1 − δ + r)) where (1 −
δ)v1 +v2 = p−r and v1 = 1 intersect is strictly above
the horizontal axis. In other words, Segment 4 is
indeed a triangular region in this sub-case, exactly
as depicted. A similar logic applies to Segment 3 as
well. Note that the triangle in each case degenerates
to a point when p= 1− δ+ r+ r
δ
, which is why the
condition p ≤ 1− δ + r + r
δ
is also critical to spec-
ifying the sub-case as well as its geometry. In fact,
every sub-case of (2) has its own unique geometry—
either in terms of the segments contributing to the
bundle demand or with respect to their shapes, or
possibly both.
Now, it is clear from Figure 1 that the red


























, just as does the
blue one. The total demand for the sub-case follows
immediately from a straightforward addition. All
other sub-cases can be derived in a similar manner.
The whole exercise is extremely tedious. Fortunately,
however, the end result is reasonably tractable.
We are now ready to characterize the optimal pric-
ing strategy of the manufacturer for a given r. Opti-
mizing pq(p), where q(p) is as in (2), leads to the
following important result.
Proposition 3. Let the shorthand A denote the
positive square root of:
2
(
2δ4− 4δ3r− 5δ3 + 2δ2r2 + 2δ2r+ 6δ2 + 3δr2





Then the optimal bundle price in the presence of
piracy is as shown in Table 1.
The equilibrium demand can now be obtained by
substituting the optimal price in Table 1 into (2),
and the optimal profit, by multiplying the equilib-
rium demand with price. Both the optimal profit and
price are non-decreasing in r and non-increasing in
δ, which is intuitive since both a higher r and a lower
δ imply a weakened competition from piracy.
4.3. Bundling vs. Separate Selling in
the Presence of Piracy
Propositions 2 and 3 together provide us the key
insights that we seek in this paper. How does piracy
affect the optimality of bundling? Is bundling still
optimal across the board as in Proposition 1? To
answer these questions, we now compare the optimal
revenue from Proposition 3 with that from Proposi-
tion 2 at different r and δ values. This comparison
is shown in Figure 2. Note that the region above
the r= δ line is uninteresting, as piracy is trivially a
non-issue there. In the region below the line, which
is both interesting and non-trivial, selling separately
dominates in the shaded portion and bundling, in
the rest of the parameter space.
Figure 2 essentially depicts the impact of piracy
on the effectiveness of bundling. It shows that, in
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Figure 1. Bundle Demand in the Presence of Piracy When δ(1−δ)
2−δ ≤ r < δ and
2r
δ
<p≤ 1− δ+ r+ r
δ
; S2–S4 Represent
Demands from Segments 2–4; Demand from Segment 1 Is 0 in This Case
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Table 1. Optimal Bundle Price with Piracy














































































































Figure 2. Bundling vs. Separate Selling in the Presence of Piracy
the presence of piracy, bundling is no longer opti-
mal across the board. More importantly, the shaded
region is sizable, naturally making it both significant
and relevant from a practical standpoint. Further-
more, as δ increases, so does the range of values of
r for which selling separately is now optimal. This
is reflected in the funnel-like shape of the shaded
region. The funnel shape is in fact instructive. Since,
in many real-world contexts, pirated products are
reasonably close substitutes for the legal one—that
is, δ is often close to 1 in reality—piracy ought
to merit a serious consideration from digital-goods
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manufacturers seeking to use bundling. Instead of
presuming that bundling is automatically optimal
for zero-marginal-cost goods, manufacturers should
carefully evaluate all its options.
What explains such an impact of piracy on
the optimality of bundling? In particular, why is
bundling no longer the best strategy across the
board? To understand, let us first note that, in sit-
uations where δ is sufficiently large, a very high r
or a very low r works in favor of bundling, whereas
quite the opposite happens in the region where r is
moderate. In other words, there are two boundaries
that separates the regions where bundling is optimal
and where it is not: (i) the bottom boundary where
we cross over from a low r to a moderate one and (ii)
the top boundary where we cross over from a moder-
ate r to a high one. The rationales behind these two
boundaries are somewhat different. The top bound-
ary is nearly linear and can be approximated by an
upward sloping line. In other words, this boundary
implies that if r is larger than a certain multiple of δ,
bundling takes over as the dominant strategy. This
is because when r is significantly large compared to
δ, piracy is not potent enough to make any mate-
rial difference to the manufacturer’s strategy, and we
are essentially back to the world where bundling is
known to prevail.
Now, the lower boundary is a bit different. It arises
from the fact that, at a moderate r, selling sepa-
rately is quite effective in mitigating piracy whereas
bundling is not. A closer look at the two dashed lines
in Figure 2 makes this point quite apparent. The
red-dashed line represents the threshold above which
selling separately becomes effective in holding piracy
to a nominal level, and the blue-dashed line repre-
sents the point where bundling is able to achieve the
same.1 Clearly, between the two lines, separate sell-
ing is more effective in controlling piracy, which is
also why it can also dominate bundling profit-wise
in a good part of the region in-between. Below the
red dashed line, however, neither strategy is effec-
tive in controlling piracy, so the usual dominance of
bundling remains intact.
The broader takeaway is apparent. Piracy makes
bundling less attractive only because bundling
makes piracy more attractive. To the best of our
1 When the manufacturer sells separately, piracy occurs in the
equilibrium only in the region below the red curve; see Propo-
sition 2 and the adjoining discussion. However, when the man-
ufacturer resorts to bundling, the piracy region expands con-
siderably and swallows the entire space below the blue straight






knowledge, this is a new insight, and it augments
the existing literature on bundling and piracy. More
importantly, it is also practically relevant. As dis-
cussed in the introduction, bundling has already
been blamed for higher piracy rates in certain mar-
kets [2, 12]. So, the possibility that piracy could be
having a significant negative effect on the usefulness
of bundling should not be ignored by sellers in those
markets.
5. Conclusion
Bundling is quite popular in various information-
goods markets. This popularity owes itself, in part,
to the underlying cost structure—as shown in prior
research, bundling is particularly preferable to sep-
arate selling when the bundle constituents can be
produced at a zero marginal cost [6]. Thanks to its
solid microeconomic foundations, this wisdom has
long become the primary yardstick for assessing the
efficacy of bundling in many information-goods mar-
kets. In this work, we put this wisdom under spot-
light once again, in order to test its generalizablity
to contexts afflicted with piracy.
Our endeavor is of obvious practical importance.
Information goods are not only unique with respect
to their cost structure, but they are also so when
it comes to their easy reproducibility, a characteris-
tic that naturally makes them vulnerable to piracy.
Given how widespread piracy is today and how
broad its reach has become, it is indeed important to
find out whether the well-known efficacy of bundling
for zero-marginal-cost goods would also hold in a
setting fraught with piracy. To this end, we employ
a parsimonious setup that involves two important
parameters—δ, which captures the quality difference
between the legal and illegal products, and r that
captures the cost of piracy. The interesting question
is then: Is the superiority of bundling anyway con-
tingent on r and δ?
The answer to the above question happens to be
a resounding ‘yes.’ Figure 2, which compares the
optimal profit obtained from Proposition 3 with
that from Proposition 2, makes this amply clear.
As shown in that figure, there is a sizable region in
the (δ, r) space where bundling is no longer optimal
despite the assumption of a zero marginal cost. This
region, where bundling is now dominated, has the
shape of a funnel—it is the widest near δ = 1, and as
δ becomes smaller, it gradually tapers off, implying
that the range of values of r for which piracy renders
bundling ineffective is non-decreasing in δ.
The economic underpinning of Proposition 3 is
quite interesting. The primary benefit of bundling is
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that it reduces demand elasticity and increases the
pricing power of the monopolist. However, raising
the price is possible only if the monopolist is still in
command of its monopoly power, which is clearly not
the case at large values of δ. In fact, when the illegal
product is a very close substitute for the legal one,
piracy offers the manufacturer a very strong com-
petition. The net result is a significant reduction in
the monopolist’s pricing power and a sharp decline
in its ability to profit from bundling.
The overall implication is clear. Bundling of infor-
mation goods is far less useful in contexts fraught
with piracy. When the pirated product is close to the
legal one in terms of quality, a zero marginal cost
does not automatically make bundling the dominant
strategy. The manufacturer must proceed with abun-
dant caution and properly evaluate both options—
bundling and separate selling—with appropriate
market research, instead of rushing to conclusions.
6. Ongoing Research
How widely applicable is the insight that piracy
makes bundling less appealing to a manufacturer?
Does it apply to situations where bundling has
additional advantages vis-à-vis separate selling? To
answer these questions, we are now examining the
applicability of our findings to various practical sit-
uations. For example, it is important to find out
what happens when consumers’ valuations for the
two bundle constituents are negatively correlated. In
general, a strong negative correlation is expected to
favor bundling [1]. So, it is not immediately clear if
our results would extend to settings with such cor-
relations. Also, how piracy impacts the efficacy of
mixed bundling remains an open question. Mixed
bundling, in general, is superior to bundling, as it
entails a better segmentation of the consumer mar-
ket. So, it is important to verify if our insights with
respect to the impacts of piracy on pure bundling
would carry over to mixed bundling. Our prelim-
inary investigation suggests that they indeed do,
although only qualitatively.
There are a few other issues to consider as well,
for example, the possibility of an endogenous piracy
cost, which is particularly likely if manufacturers
are able to lobby with the government for stricter
anti-piracy enforcement [21]. There is also an obvi-
ous need to verify that our results indeed extend
to settings with more than two products. We are
currently in the process of rigorously analyzing all
these possibilities, in order to develop a more com-
prehensive picture of the interplay between piracy
and bundling.
Finally, we assumed a monopoly setting, and it is
not clear whether the insights from our work would
carry over to a scenario where competition is sig-
nificant. Broadly speaking, the monopoly assump-
tion has merits. Information goods, by their very
nature, affords their manufacturers some monopoly
power—there is only one software like Microsoft
Word, only one television series like The Game of
Thrones, and only one movie like Life is Beautiful.
The examples mentioned in the introduction of this
work also point to consumers’ disenchantment with
high prices, which again is reflective of substantial
monopoly power. Naturally, the presumption of a
monopoly or near-monopoly is not only realistic in
our context, but it is also quite common in the exist-
ing literature on bundling of information goods [e.g.,
6, 22]. Since our primary objective is to see whether
the insights from this literature actually hold in the
presence of piracy, we employ a similar monopoly
setup; doing so facilitates an apple-to-apple compar-
ison of our results to the ones in prior works, which
in turn makes it easier for us to isolate the impact
of piracy on the usefulness of bundling.
Nevertheless, the issue of competition could be
important for certain manufacturers. While we leave
the task of analyzing competition to future research,
it would be remiss of us to not note that piracy
essentially plays the role of a shadow competitor. In
our setup, piracy injects competition into an other-
wise monopolistic market, making it difficult for the
manufacturer to enjoy its monopoly power that is
critical to reaping the full benefit of bundling. Since
competition among manufacturers also dents their
pricing power, it would seem that competition itself
will keep prices somewhat low, and piracy under
control, making the latter less relevant in the pro-
cess. Further, stronger competition among manufac-
turers might add to lure of bundling [10], making
our results somewhat less critical in competitive set-
tings. Additional research is necessary to developing
a clear intuition about these interactions.
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